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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this study is to illustrate, with a simple two-region, two-good, two-factor model, how 
an improvement in one region’s import infrastructure can affect firms’ location decisions and the nature 
of the trading equilibrium. It is shown that, through improvements in import infrastructure, one region 
might divert high-tech industries to another region. This effect reduces the incentive to improve import 
infrastructure. 
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1  Introduction 
In the last decade the role of public infrastructure in regional economies, such as ports, railway networks, 
and new telecommunications networks, has been widely discussed.1 It is increasingly recognized that 
the growing connectivity of individuals and organizations is achieved through improvements in the 
quality of public infrastructure which reduces transaction costs between regions, and a consequent 
increase in the flow of goods and services across regions. Related to this, competing new economic 
geography theories imply that regional integration might serve to greatly reduce regional inequalities.2 
In a recent influential contribution, Martin and Rogers (1995) proposed a new way to model various 
types of public infrastructure, which allows the analysis of its impact on trade patterns, industrial 
location, and welfare. They show that firms with increasing returns will tend to locate in the countries 
(or regions) with the best infrastructure in order to take advantage of economies of scale. In particular, 
they show that an improvement in domestic infrastructure in one country (or region) will imply a 
relocation of firms to this country (or region) (Martin and Rogers, 1995, p. 344). The intuition is that, as 
the quality of infrastructure improves, the transaction costs of goods produced and consumed in that 
country (or region) decrease, increasing the effective demand.  
However, Martin and Rogers (1995) do not distinguish between export infrastructure and import 
infrastructure: an improvement in the quality of infrastructure implies a symmetric reduction in 
transaction costs for both exports and imports. This assumption is justified for simplification. However, 
infrastructure improvements often cause asymmetric reductions in transaction costs. For example, an 
improvement in the quality of a region’s local transport networks affects the region’s imports more than 
its exports.3 Given these observations, the present study focuses on the role of import infrastructure in 
                                                 
1See, for example, Costa-Font and Rodriguez-Oreggia (2005), Limao and Venables (2001), and Mori and Nishikimi 
(2002). 
 
2See, for example, Fujita et al. (1999), Ottaviano and Thisse (2004), and Behrens et al. (2007). 
 
3See World Bank (2004) for discussion. 
facilitating import transactions. The purpose of this study is to illustrate, with a simple two-region, 
two-good (homogeneous good/differentiated high-tech products), two-factor (labor/capital) model, how 
an improvement in one region’s import infrastructure can affect firms’ location decisions and the nature 
of the trading equilibrium. In contrast to Martin and Rogers (1995), it will be shown that, through 
improvements in import infrastructure, one region might divert high-tech industries to another region. 
The main result of the current study, which captures the negative effect of the domestic infrastructure, 
has not appeared in the existing literature. 
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the impact of an improvement in the quality of 
import infrastructure on the location of industries. 
 
 
2  The Model 
Suppose that there are two regions (Region 1 and Region 2), each with two factors (capital, K  and 
labor, L ) and two types of goods (a homogeneous good and a large variety of differentiated high-tech 
products). Assume that the regions are identical in regard to tastes, size, and technology, but differ with 
respect to the costs of importing differentiated high-tech products. We assume these costs are directly 
related to the quality of import infrastructure.  
It is important to note that the present model is a variant of Kikuchi (2005). There are two main 
differences between the present setup and Kikuchi (2005)’s one: (1) the former labels two factors as 
capital and labor, while the latter labels those as skilled and unskilled labor; (2) the former assumes that 
the distribution of factor endowments is identical among regions, while the latter assumes that the 
distribution of factor endowments is different between countries. Although the assumption of the 
identical factor endowments is quite strong, it is in order for simplifying the analysis. 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
Consumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences over both categories and spend fraction m  of their 
income on high-tech products. Region i ’s price index for high-tech products is represented by the 
Dixit-Stiglitz form: 
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where s  is the degree of substitution among all products, ip  is the producer prices for high-tech 
products produced in region i , and in  is the number of varieties produced in region i , respectively. 
Import costs ( 1)i it t >  for the high-tech products are in the form of “iceberg costs.” We assume these 
costs are directly related to the quality of region i ’s import infrastructure: changes in these costs 
represent changes in import infrastructure. Thus, the consumer demand functions in region i  for a 
region i  (i.e., local) variety and a region j  (i.e., imported) variety are respectively 
                 
)3(,)(
)2(,
1
1
iijiij
iiiii
EPptc
EPpc
m
m
ss
ss
--
--
=
=
 
where iE  is the total income in Region i (i , j=1, 2). 
The homogeneous good is produced with constant returns, using only labor as an input. Units are 
chosen so that one unit of labor produces one unit of output. As usual in new geography models, no 
transport costs exist for the homogeneous good, which serves to tie down the wage rate. Also assume 
that the parameters of the model are such that both regions produce the homogeneous good; thus, 
constant, identical wages for labor hold (hereafter set to unity). 
The production of each variety of high-tech product requires one unit of capital to develop the product 
and b  units of labor per unit of output. As in Martin and Rogers (1995) and Martin and Ottaviano 
(1999), the central assumption of the present analysis is that the capital is firm specific, but it moves 
freely between regions: if a variety developed by Region 1’s capital is produced in Region 2 , the 
operating profits are repatriated to Region 1 . Given a Dixit-Stiglitz specification with constant elasticity 
s , each firm sets its price as 1 2 ( ) / ( 1)p p bs s= = - . In order to simplify the analysis, we choose units 
such that ( 1) /b s s= -  to have 
1 2 1.                                                                      (4)p p= =  
Given that one unit of capital is required to develop a product, the payment for each unit of capital 
employed in Region i  (i=1, 2), ir , must satisfy 
/ ,                                                             (5)i i i i ir p x x xb s= - =  
where ix  is the output of a representative firm in Region i . When capital mobility is unrestricted, the 
payment for capital will be equalized between regions, which implies that 1 2r r=  and thus 
1 2 .                                                                         (6)x x=  
 
 
3  Import Infrastructure and Industrial Location 
Now consider the firms’ location decisions. The product market equilibrium in Region i  requires that 
supply equals demand for each variety: i ii j jix c t c= + . Substituting (2) , (3) , and (4)  into this 
condition yields the following equilibrium condition: 
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where iE r K Lº +  and 1 ( 1)i i it st t-º <  measures the freedom of trade, which is directly related to the 
quality of Region i ’s import infrastructure. 
Using (6) , (7)  and (8) , the equilibrium share of Region 1 firms, 1s  can be obtained: 
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Equation (9)  implies the surprising feature of infrastructure policies, which is highly contrasted with 
the result of Martin and Rogers (1995) (i.e., firms’ relocation to the region with a better infrastructure). 
 
Proposition: An improvement in the quality of import infrastructure in a region will induce a diversion 
of high-tech products away from that region. 
 
Figure 1  illustrates the implications of this proposition. The horizontal axis shows the share of 
high-tech firms in Region 1 , 1s , and the vertical axis shows the equilibrium output level in each region, 
ix . A decreasing (resp. increasing) curve corresponds to (7)  [resp. (8) ]: the equilibrium share of 
firms is obtained from the intersection of these curves. To simplify the argument, let us assume that 
initially 1 2t t=  holds and 1 1 / 2s = . 
Now, suppose that the quality of Region 1’s import infrastructure improves (i.e., 1t  increases). This 
change induces two effects. First, it shifts the curve representing Region 1’s equilibrium condition 
downward: lower trade costs imply an increase in the effective number of imported varieties, 1 2nt , 
which leads to a fall in local demand for locally produced varieties in Region 1. Second, it shifts the 
curve representing Region 2 ’s equilibrium condition upward: easier access to the Region 1  market 
increases the advantage of locating in Region 2 . These two effects reinforce each other and induce 
high-tech firms (i.e., capital) to flow out of Region 1 . 
This result has important policy implications for regional economies. Improvements in import 
infrastructure in one region can divert firms in high-tech industries over to another region. This lowers 
the incentive to improve import infrastructure. Although better import infrastructure reduces import 
transaction costs, it also induces industrial diversion and raises the transaction costs of receiving 
products from those industries that relocate elsewhere. The possibility that industries will be diverted 
provides some theoretical grounds for the coordination of infrastructure investments among regional 
economies. Further research should focus on these policy implications. 
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